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COMMENTARY
Farmers’ upheaval, climate crisis and populism
Jan Douwe van der Ploeg
Chair of Rural Sociology, Wageningen University, Wageningen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article aims to unravel underlying reasons for the enigmatic
outburst of farmers’ fury that swept large parts of Europe in the
autumn of 2019. It does so by focussing on the Netherlands
where the upheaval was particularly striking. Farmers’ resentment
against ‘agribashing’ was a common theme in the many protests.
This refers to, and simultaneously delegitimizes, all critiques of the
current organization of farming and the unequal international
patterns in which it is embedded. The article argues that the
currently emerging farmers’ movement basically represents a
regressive populism. It ignores the many-sided crisis of agriculture
(related to ever increasing use of nitrogen, pesticides and energy
that contribute to the climate crisis and loss of biodiversity) and
the politico-economic processes and unequal power relations
underlying this. Although this movement creates many smoke
screens, it is essentially fighting for the reproduction of the same
order that makes a substantial contribution to these multiple
crises. As international comparison shows, this new form of right-
wing, rural populism reflects the degree to which entrepreneurial
agriculture has internalized the logic of capital: it needs ongoing
expansion, both for material and symbolic reasons. Peasant
agriculture could provide a much needed counter-image to this.
In practice, though, it is highly segmented and dispersed and is in
urgent need of a new unifying device.
KEYWORDS
Entrepreneurial agriculture;
protests; climate crisis;
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1. ‘Stumbling farmers’
In the last months of 2019 farmers took to the streets throughout the Netherlands. Not just
once but several times. With long columns of thousands of heavy tractors and many more
farmers they occupied one of the central squares of the Hague and threatened to take
over the Houses of Parliament. The government responded by declaring that, in the
latter case, the army would intervene. In the meantime large sections of the national
highway network were blocked. As a consequence the Netherlands witnessed the
biggest traffic jam ever, with 1,136 kilometres of tailbacks. The massive demonstrations
impressed many observers (not in the least the farmers themselves). At the same time
people were puzzled. What were these protests about? What did the farmers want?
There was, especially during the first rounds of protest, a myriad of slogans, most of
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which were highly confusing. One major newspaper wrote about ‘stumbling farmers’. The
demonstrating farmers said they would not accept ‘unequal treatment’ anymore and that
‘farmer bashing’ had to come to an end. At the same time they claimed to want ‘respect’
and opposed being ‘curtailed’. These were very general demands which are hard to dis-
agree with, but some eyebrows were raised: ‘respect’, for instance, is something that is to
be earned – it cannot be claimed. But apart from that – what did the farmers really
want? Previous waves of struggle (especially in the 1970s and ‘80s) were mostly focused
on clear programmes with specific demands that would provide concrete improvements.
This time there just was a confusing cloud of statements that, above all else, reflected
anger and grievance. The angry farmers were highly critical of policies meant to reduce
nitrogen emissions (46% of all nitrogen in the Netherlands is emitted by animal husbandry).
Surprisingly then, they welcomed the Secretary of State, who made a mess of this policy, as
if he were a popular hero. By contrast, politicians of the radical left, who had no say in the
design of agrarian politics, were whistled at during the demonstrations as if they were the
ones responsible for it. There clearly was, and is, ‘something rotten’ in the countryside but
nobody really understands what it is. On the one hand the massive demonstrations
reflected real, deeply-rooted and widespread discontent. On the other, though, this
tragedy unfolded as a burlesque. Farmers have never found it easy to deal with distribu-
tional issues (especially when in the context of a zero-sum game). But now they were
facing partition at national and even international level (in the sense that decisions need
to be made about how much nitrogen emissions are to be reduced, by whom, where,
when and how?). Their response made them seem both desperate and unreasonable.
However, the demonstrating farmers (and their committees)1 perceived things differently.
They were euphoric that they had succeeded in getting a ‘clear line’ drawn. The manifes-
tations felt like victory: their strength had been proven. From now onwards, curtailing pol-
icies would no longer be accepted anymore, be they for nitrogen, or any other reason.
2. The climate crisis
Regardless of all the confusion there was, and is, a clear background. That is the pending
climate crisis and the very urgent need to deal with it. The climate crisis is strongly related
with fossil energy use and associated CO2 emissions. In contrast, it only has a weak and
limited relationship with nitrogen use and the associated ammonia emissions2. But in
the perception of angry farmers there is a clear and pernicious linkage3. Both nitrogen
and fossil energy are, in their view, taken as starting point, and justification, for succes-
sively curtailing farmers. This was reaffirmed, in the autumn of 2019, when the high-
1The most influential committee (and associated network) is tellingly named the ‘Farmers Defence Force’.
2The production of chemical fertilizer (N) requires considerable fossil energy. Beyond that, soils emit N2O, di-nitrogen-
oxide, especially after heavy fertilization with chemical fertilizer. N2O contributes to global heating, but far less than
CH4 and CO2.
3In a large protest meeting in Bremen, in neighbouring Germany, Daniëlle Hekman of the Dutch ‘Farmers Defence Force’
(who was in Bremen to thank German farmers for their help during demonstrations in the Netherlands) claimed that
Climate Salafists are destroying us. It is a telling statement, especially in as far as it ties different ingredients together:
(1) although German protests are directed against nitrogen policies and restrictions on glyphosate (Roundup), these
were lumped together here with ‘climate’: all part of one concerted attack meant to destroy us; (2) the statement dis-
credits all preoccupations about climate change by adding the adjective ‘Salafist’. This turns all attention to climate
change, environmental degradation, and pesticide use into ever so many expressions of terrorism. Finally (3) there is
us: the underdogs, which together are being threatened by destruction.
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level ‘Remkes Commission’ that is directly advising the Government published a prelimi-
nary advice. Under the telling title that ‘Not everything is possible anymore’, this Commis-
sion indicated that, to address the nitrogen problem, reductions of the national herd
would be unavoidable. This was seen as a precursor of the consequences of climate
policy which, if it were to be rigorously pursued, would require far greater reductions in
the national herd than measures to address problems related to nitrogen.
In 1950 Dutch farms used 81 Gigajoule (GJ) of fossil energy to produce an amount of
food with an energy content of 100 Gigajoule (Smit 2018). This energy input was com-
posed of 41 GJ contained in direct energy (petrol, gas, electricity, etc.) and 40 GJ of indir-
ect energy (energy needed for producing chemical fertilizers, tractors, implements,
buildings, etc.). By 2015 the amount of fossil energy to produce the same amount of
food (with an energy content of 100GJ) had risen to 225 GJ. This nearly threefold
increase resides partly in increases in the use of direct energy (from 41 GJ to 101 GJ)
and partly in the increase of indirect energy (from 40 to 124 GJ) (all data derived
from Smit 2018). These changes directly relate to, and clearly reflect, the structural
changes that Dutch agriculture has experienced in intervening years. Since the 1950s,
Dutch peasant agriculture has been restructured, albeit in uneven ways, into an entre-
preneurial agriculture. Labour has been moved out and replaced by capital (in the
form of new, energy consuming technologies, and loans to finance them). At the
same time, farming became strongly (but again, in uneven ways) integrated in upstream
markets. Whereas self-provisioning (of feed and fodder, seeds, traction power, knowl-
edge, etc.) used to be the norm, restructuration (or ‘modernization’ as it was called at
the time) meant that increasing proportions of the needed inputs (many of them con-
taining much fossil energy) were mobilized through different markets (instead of being
produced on the farm itself). Thus, new styles of farming emerged: large-scale, with high
levels of intensity that depend on technology and input-use, specialized and engaged in
ongoing expansion. This latter feature is associated with high levels of indebtedness: in
order to make the necessary repayments increases in scale become almost a material
necessity.
It is important to signal here that it is not the high level of intensity (symbolized by, and
in, high physical yields) as such that requires high input levels of fossil energy. A compari-
son with China’s agriculture (that is as intensive as Dutch agriculture) shows that the
former has far lower input levels for fossil energy (to produce a comparable amount of
food). In Chinese agriculture far more labour is used, which explains the far lower use of
fossil energy (both directly and indirectly). This is because Chinese agriculture is far
more peasant-like than Dutch agriculture (data from Yu 2019). The way that farming is
organized and developed (i.e. ‘the mode of production’) is decisive in determining fossil
energy-use in agriculture – not yields as such.
Equally important is that, alongside a clear entrepreneurial pole, there are also consider-
able numbers of farmers who operate in peasant-like ways. They never fully adopted the
‘modernization’ repertoire, resisted attempts to encourage them to change trajectory and
sometimes developed solid alternatives. Thus, the Dutch farming community is highly
differentiated, something that was clearly reflected in the initially highly confusing panor-
ama offered by the recent manifestations of discontent. Nearly all farmers are upset – but
their grievances are very different.
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3. Reducing the herds
When farmers say that they do not want to be ‘chained’ or ‘curtailed’, this often refers to
policies that aim to restrict the use of nitrogen or to reduce the associated ammonia emis-
sions. Nitrogen and ammonia are taken as pars-pro-toto for the more general environ-
mental issue. Reducing nitrogen and ammonia is, in farmers’ perceptions, the prelude
for the required mitigation of climate change. Nitrogen (N) played an important, albeit
confusing, role in the recent protests. The huge ammonia emissions of Dutch animal hus-
bandry (that negatively affect nature and biodiversity) are a strong reason for seriously dis-
cussing the magnitude and nature of the sector and arguing that reductions of the herds
are unavoidable. Climate change does the same: it makes discussion about the magnitude
of the national herd unavoidable. These discussions subsequently trigger disquiet and pro-
tests on the side of farmers, who sense that this implies ‘curtailing’. They argue that they
are tired of being ‘curtailed’, time and again –with one measure following another and the
next one never far away. Farmer’s sense of injustice is magnified since they consider that
‘others’ (industry, traffic, airplanes) hardly take their share of the burden: under the reign-
ing rhetoric, it is, as Ry Cooder sang, the ‘poor farmer who has to take it all’.
Yet, the nitrogen problem cannot be seen as an issue that has just recently emerged.
The Ministry of Agriculture first published a policy paper on it as long ago as 1974
(Nota ‘Intensieve Veehouderij’) and ever since then the farmers’ unions have done every-
thing in their power to deny the problem and sabotage any policy meant to deal with
it (Frouws 1993). A belated echo of this position emerged during the recent protests
when the ‘Agrarian Collective’ (the organizations, committees and networks that orga-
nized the demonstrations) talked about the ‘fabricated nitrogen impasse’ (as if it was
the state that created the problem). Beyond that, the methods to effectively tackle the
problem (adapt feeding strategies by using less protein, reducing applications of chemical
fertilizer and diluting slurry with water before spreading it on the land) are already known
and have been tested for at least 25 years. Large segments of Dutch agriculture (especially,
but not exclusively, the peasant-like farming styles) have already applied such measures,
strongly reduced N-use and ammonia emissions and by doing so they even improved their
incomes (Dirksen et al. 2013; Reijs 2019; Evers et al. 2019). What happened, though, was
that nitrogen and ammonia were used as a battleground for a completely different
fight. To understand this we have to turn, again, to the highly differentiated nature of
the Dutch farming population which results in contemporary problems being framed in
specific ways.
4. Contrasting worldviews
A recent nation-wide survey organized and published by the daily newspaper Trouw
(2018, n = 2,287) highlights both the commonly shared views and the deep divisions
within the Dutch agricultural sector. What farmers have in common is that they love
their jobs, cherish their independence and are proud of the farm they develop. They
equally share a feeling that things are getting worse as they experience ongoing
regression and crisis. More than three quarters of the respondents fully (40.9%) or partly
(34.6%) agree with the statement that farmers were better off 20 years ago than they
are today. And nearly 85% think that the countryside is suffering a socio-political crisis.
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While farming is a highly appreciated profession, farmers feel they are increasingly
under pressure. This is the comunis opinio. Beyond this commonly shared view there is,
however, a deep division. The same survey brought two, highly contrasting visions to
the fore. One centres on the organization of farming, the other mainly focuses on ‘others’.
In the first vision, the crisis is first and foremost perceived as located inside agriculture
itself. That is: the dominant organizational patterns and development trajectories are
seen as root causes of the current agrarian crisis. Farmers sharing this view argue that
‘the export orientation [of Dutch agriculture], that is sustained by ongoing scale increases
[at farm enterprise level], is not feasible in the longer run’ (55.2% of all respondents agreed
with this point of view). Consequently, they argue that ‘our country should not pretend to
provide food to considerable parts of the rest of the world’ (44.4%). Such a position is
totally at odds with the dominant view (or ‘Wageningen model’ as it is often presented
in the Netherlands) that stresses the export-model and the associated large-scale, inten-
sive and specialized organization and development of agriculture. In this respect, it is
telling that 45.7% of the surveyed farmers are of the opinion that highly specialized
farms, producing just one product, ‘are far too vulnerable’. The negative consequences
that these trends have beyond the farm gate are equally recognized: 46.1% believed
that the way farming is developing is damaging the landscape. The political economy
underlying all this is clear to the majority: 64.5% agreed that ‘we are working, above all,
for the benefit of banks, food industry and big retailers’.
In the second, strongly contrasting, vision the crisis of, and in, agriculture is seen as basi-
cally down to factors located outside of the agricultural sector. It is ‘others’ who are to
blame: be they consumers, citizens, politicians, journalists, animal rights’ activists,
‘climate nerds’, or whatever. ‘Farmers are squeezed because the consumers do not want
to pay more for their food’ (78.0%)4. ‘The media always blame the farmer’. ‘Animal
rights activists propagate false information’. ‘Citizens have no knowledge whatsoever
about farming’. ‘Farmers work bloody hard, but do not get any recognition’. Such state-
ments mutually reaffirm each other – and together they reflect a deep discontent.
Farmers are aggrieved. There is widespread indignation. Many of the elements that
together compose this sense of injustice are, for sure, rooted in real life experiences. None-
theless, the outcry typically is solely focused on ‘the others’. The way they relate to, and
behave towards, farming is wrong, and this is due to misinformation or bad intentions.
Farming itself is devoid of any responsibility.
These two visions do, of course, overlap. And this makes for a coalition that seems, at
first sight, nearly impossible. Strong social control in the countryside also contributes to
this. However, the hard core, the gravitational centre, of the two visions differ significantly
and substantially from each other. This is reflected in the calls for action they give rise to.
The second, populist-type of vision, places all responsibility at the level of consumers. They
have to change, and only when (or if) they change effectively, will farmers then move
farming forward (e.g. only after getting better prices they will invest in environmentally
friendly measures). By blaming others, farmers relieve themselves from any responsibility.
The same applies to the belief that citizens are not knowledgeable about agriculture:
4What is lacking from such an analysis is any reference to the huge gap between consumer prices and farm gate prices. This
renders the role of large retailers invisible.
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which provides, as it were, an anti-serum against the widespread and many-sided critiques
that are articulated towards farming, since ‘they don’t know what they are talking about’.
In the contrasting vision there is more focus on the farming community’s search for
practical improvements and on building new coalitions with both consumers and citizens.
This is resulting in new, often multifunctional, farms and new institutional arrangements
that create new balances between farming, nature and society5. However, the search
for novel practices is often frustrated by the asphyxiating regulatory schemes imposed
by the state. This makes those sharing the second vision often as upset about the govern-
ment (and especially the Ministry of Agriculture) as the others.
The view that centres on the others is strongly populist, partly because it neglects
inequalities in power, just as it rides roughshod over politico-economic contradictions,
and reduces differentiation within the sector to a mere difference between ‘winners’ (or
at least: those who think they have the ‘right to win’) and ‘losers’. Tellingly, the main popu-
list parties of the Netherlands (FvD and PVV)6, headed respectively by Thierry Baudet and
Geert Wilders, immediately and wholeheartedly supported the movement of the
aggrieved farmers.
The deep divisions within the farming population (and the absolute incapacity to deal
with the associated internal conflicts) translate into a deeply rooted and many-sided dis-
trust and also into high levels of disorientation. 77.7% of all farmers find themselves ‘not
represented by their farmers’ union’ (37.1% partly agrees, 40.6% agrees fully). Neither do
farmers have much confidence or faith in institutions such as the Ministry of Agriculture
and universities (but it is to be admitted here that the latter have done little to gain
such confidence).
The spurred development of ‘mega-farms’ (representing the biggest farms, which are
very specialized and reliant on sophisticated high technology and bank loans) are iconic
symbols of the hegemonic development trend. Institutions such as the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Wageningen University (especially its senior management), agro-industries and
banks argue that only ‘very large farms are able to face competition at world market
level’. Yet, a survey by the Socialist Party (SP) (held in 2013; n = 841) showed that only
16% of the farmers considered the emergence of mega-farms as a positive development
(Gerwen, Staarink, and Palm 2013). An earlier survey by the Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie
(LTO) [National Farmers’ Union] rendered similar results (12.5% of farmers seeing this as a
positive development). Eighty-two per cent of Dutch farmers indicated that they prefer ‘a
farm of normal/average proportions that renders a good income’. Most of them do not
believe in an ‘easy co-existence’ of mega-farms and family farms: 55% of all respondents
(in the SP survey) thought that mega farms threaten the developmental possibilities of
family farms and 56% believed that the farmers’ unions should do more to defend
family farms ‘even if that implies conflicts with agro-industries and trading companies’.
One key issue that is linked with the debate on different development trajectories is
whether or not farming needs to be linked with (if not grounded on) the land. This
especially is an issue in animal husbandry. It comes down to the question of whether or
not animal production is and should be related to the carrying capacity of the available
5See https://resource.wur.nl/upload_mm/1/4/5/afa665a8-bbcf-4249-b77f-a09081559648_NL_1-32p_resource_1405.pdf
6FvD is the Forum voor Democratie [Forum for Democracy], the largest party during the last, provincial elections; PVV is the
Partij voor de Vrijheid [Party for Freedom]
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land. Should the herd be fed with feed and fodder produced on-farm (or at least locally),
which would inherently limit herd sizes? Or is it acceptable to acquire growing parts of
feed and fodder on the market (as exemplified par excellence by mega-farms)? And, at
the other end of the cycle, is it possible to effectively use the produced manure (or
slurry) on the fields belonging to the farm or is it doomed to be part of the slurry surpluses
that threaten biodiversity (and, in the longer run, human health as well)? All this might
look, in the eyes of outsiders, as just another set of technical issues. But it is far more
than this. By purchasing growing parts of feed and fodder on the market (notably, but
not only, soy), massive flows are generated and sustained – flows that depart from
Brazil, Thailand, Senegal, the United States and several other countries and are
managed by huge international trading companies. These flows link the deforestation
of large parts of the Amazon and other areas with stimulating the export-orientation of
considerable parts of agriculture in NW Europe. They are also linked to the climate
change and the environmental crisis (notably and especially the nitrogen and ammonia
emissions) located in the North West of Europe, and the lack of food sovereignty in
many other countries (especially, but not only, in the Global South).
Farmers take positions in these global processes, just as they position themselves on
the environmental dimension – whether or not they acknowledge it. Political economy
is not something that is just located ‘out there’, far away, in the clouds. On the contrary,
it directly relates with (and even partly depends on) the decisions taken by tens of thou-
sands of farming families. And it is precisely at this point that a main difference between
peasant-like ways of farming and entrepreneurial strategies emerges. Peasant agriculture
builds as much as possible on the self-owned resource base and its internal consistency:
animals and land are brought into balance and the fine-tuning of the cycle that links
manure, soil biology, grassland production, animal feeding and the production of milk,
meat and manure is of strategic importance. Entrepreneurial farming, by contrast,
‘jumps’ over the limits of locally available resources. It engages in commodity circuits in
order to obtain the required amounts of feed and fodder and thus enables growth that
is ‘disproportionate’ to the magnitude of the farm (Driel 1982, 1984)7. ‘Relating to the
land’ [in Dutch: grondgebondenheid]8 is a hot issue in Dutch agriculture. According to
the Socialist Party’s survey 40% of all respondents opted for an agriculture that is strictly
related to the available land – while another 40% favoured the opposite (20% were
‘neutral’)9: a nearly perfect division and, consequently, a terrifying battleground10. Cur-
rently, relations with the land are further complicated through persistent processes of
land concentration (throughout the European Union) and land grabbing in Eastern
7Jaap van Driel (then working at the Farm Accountancy Institute LEI) was one of the first to signal the emergence of ‘dis-
proportionate growth’, which is not related to the magnitude of the farm, let alone to its earning and savings capacity. It
is, instead, credit driven. Later on van der Ploeg, Saccomandi, and Roep (1990) describe the same process for Italy.
Farmers refer to it as ‘making jumps’ as opposed to ‘step-by-step growth’.
8This issue is now central to agroecology.
9When it comes to their own farm, 51% of all farmers would prefer it to be related to the land.
10More generally speaking, this is one of the issues that is at the heart of a more general, if not nearly universal, problé-
matique: how is the available productive potential to be divided over (or shared by) different producers. This problem
pops up in land reform processes but was equally at the core of the European policy for milk quotas. In this respect it is
telling that in 2013 (according to the SP survey), 43% of the dairy farmers preferred a continuation of the quota system,
whilst 39% wanted it to be eliminated. Again these differences point to the seemingly irresolvable divisions within the
farming sector.
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Europe (which is partly being driven by projects that aim to enlarge soy production within
Europe) (van der Ploeg, Franco, and Borras 2015).
5. Competing for the future
Entrepreneurial farms need to continually expand. They are permanently engaged in a
‘race forward’. Ironically, this race is not only grounded in material needs (high financial
costs, and an increased vulnerability to cost increases and price decreases), but equally
has ideological considerations. Agricultural entrepreneurs feel engaged in a struggle for
the future. They perceive the future as a ‘limited good’ (Foster 1965) – that there is only
space for a limited number of very large farms who are able to operate at world market
level – and each and every one of these entrepreneurs wants to be part of this scarce
future. This triggers ruthless competition11. Being close (at least relatively close) to this
target makes a strong imprint on the identity of the entrepreneurs. As Nicole Eizner
(1985) argued already many years ago, they consider themselves to be the ‘best pupils
of the class’ – for they have done everything that was advocated by agrarian policies:
they enlarged their farms, innovated, are competitive (at least they think so) and they
are ‘feeding the world’, or so the advocates of the ‘Wageningen model’ tell them.
Entrepreneurial farms need ongoing expansion, for both material and symbolic reasons.
Entrepreneurial farmers believe they have themoral right12 (if not duty) to keep expanding
– precisely because they are ‘feeding the world’. Surpassing ecological limits (as is the case
with nitrogen and ammonia) is, in their view, no problem at all – it can be compensated for
elsewhere13. Using considerable amounts of fossil energy is unavoidable – as was tellingly
underlined by the processions of heavy diesel burning tractors to the Hague and in the
claim that ‘others’ (transport, industries, air traffic) should reduce their use of fossil
energy in the first place.
6. Creating a fire lane
In hindsight it is very clear that the massive unrest and the redundant fight against poss-
ible limits on nitrogen use were partly inspired by, and during the process became com-
pletely subsumed to, one single issue: the assumed right for continuous expansion. The
entrepreneurial pole in agriculture does not accept any limitations on this assumed
right – and this denial is strongly supported by parts of agribusiness.14 The entrepreneurs
and their committees fought a largely fictitious battle (against limitations on N-use and
11This is another basic difference. In peasant agriculture solidarity and mutual help define most of the internal relations. In
entrepreneurial agriculture it is, instead, mutual competition.
12It is, again, ironical that morality pops up in this context. For a long time it was thought that the ‘moral economy’ (Scott
1976) applied mainly or only in peasant agriculture. ‘Rationalized’ entrepreneurial agriculture only moves forward, it was
thought, according to strict economic calculation (e.g. Mendras 1984).
13This painfully coincides with the recently (re-)articulated plea of the President of Wageningen University (Mrs. Fresco) and
a former Christian-democrat Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Veerman) for the creation of an ‘agricultural main structure’
alongside the ‘ecological main structure’. The latter would provide room for nature and an absence of emissions, allowing
for ongoing emissions and expansion in the former.
14Big companies producing animal feed (such as de Heus and Agrifirm) and food industries such as VION supported the
protests (financially, logistically and politically). Other agroindustries, such as Friesland Campina, were hesitant because
sustainability is a key part of their marketing strategy. Angry farms reacted by blocking the factories and headquarters of
the companies that did not give their support.
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ammonia-emissions) as part of a broader strategic agenda: resisting any attempts inspired
by the patently obvious energy and climate crises to limit further expansion of farm enter-
prises. This partly real, partly imaginary battle (against limitations on N-use) can best be
compared with making a fire lane in threatened woods. It involves burning parts of the
woodlands in order to prevent a complete bush fire that will ‘destroy us all’ (see footnote
4 of this paper).
The programme of the contesting entrepreneurs (Landbouw Collectief 2019) reads as a
novel by Gabriel Garcia-Marquez. Nothing seems real, everything means something that
differs from what is actually said. It is suggested, for instance, that there is no real
problem with nitrogen and ammonia15 – the problem is ‘fabricated’ by the state. In the
same vein, the programme ‘offers’ (as is literally said) to reduce ammonia emissions
through adaptations of feeding rations, using less chemical fertilizers and adding water
to slurry. But this is already being done by loads of farmers! In this respect, the proposal
of the contesting farmers was nothing but a ‘wind egg’ [an empty shell] as the editor-
in-chief of one of the agrarian media observed (Maanen 2019, 2): it was void, in all possible
respects. Nonetheless, the proposal seeks subsidies of up to 3 billion Euros and simul-
taneously states that farmers will only engage on a ‘voluntary basis’ and it gives no guar-
antee on the effectiveness of the suggested measures (Landbouw Collectief 2019, 3)16.
Especially telling is that the ‘room’ created through reductions is to remain the ‘property’
of the agricultural sector that could either be ‘leased’ to others (to enable construction of
houses or industrial expansion) or to be used ‘for further growth at farm enterprise level’.
Thus, the nitrogen problem would be, de facto, converted into yet another mechanism for
expansion.
The first round of negotiations (between the ‘collective’ of protesting organizations and
committees on the one hand17, and representatives of the State, the Prime Minister
included, on the other) brought a remarkable outcome: the decision that ‘there will be
no generic reduction of the herds’. This was, and is, a highly significant message, as it
shows that the hegemony of entrepreneurial farms is not to be questioned. The second
round of negotiations brought another telling outcome: there will be no forced closure
of any farm whatsoever (implying that farms located within or nearby nature areas will
not be affected, not even when they emit huge amounts of ammonia).
Thus, at the end of the day there were no results that benefitted all farmers (for example
an adaptation of overly rigid regulations, or the possibility to decide at farm level about the
most effective mix of measures, or regional differentiation, etc.). The only thing the ‘Agrar-
ian Collective’ aimed at, and obtained, through the negotiations was consolidation of the
room for agricultural entrepreneurs to expand further (and to be supported financially)
and – once again – a postponement of an effective and timely tackling of the nitrogen,
energy and climate crises.
15There evidently is a problem: the agricultural sector annually emits 106 kilotons of ammonia. This is the true nucleus of
the nitrogen problem (van Maanen 2019, 2).
16Later on this was further specified. If total N and ammonia emissions would be reduced through the government bailing
out farms, the space obtained should be given to the remaining farms in order for them to expand further.
17Tellingly, this ‘collective’ is chaired by Mr. Dijkhuizen, former tycoon of Nutreco, a large industry for animal feed and (later)
president of Wageningen University, who is an outspoken spokesman of, and for, entrepreneurial agriculture. Roelof
Kleis, the science editor of Resource, the independent weekly of Wageningen University, wrote that Dijkhuizen is the
personification of the highly intensive Dutch agriculture. ‘The man is more part of the problem than part of the solution’
(Kleis 2019).
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7. Populism
There is no doubt that the movement of autumn 2019 is populist, but in a regressive way.
It is a ‘multi-class’ phenomenon. Large, entrepreneurial farmers, peasant-like farmers, farm
workers, different agribusiness groups, contract workers and other rural dwellers gathered
together without any real attempt to mediate their differing interests. It is regressively
populist in as much as it does not provide a transparent analysis of the problems that
need to be addressed. It just draws on, and further galvanizes, generalized feelings of grie-
vance and neglect. An important ingredient that helped to shape this feeling of neglect
(and being endangered) was the occupation of an intensive pig producing farm by
animal-welfare activists18. This occupation triggered the creation of ‘self-defence
groups’ that communicate through social media and promise to intervene immediately
(and, if needed, with violence) if similar episodes occur again. These networks, that later
on emerged as the Farmers’ Defence Force, became one of the organizing forces of the
demonstrations, road blocks and occupation in the autumn of 2019. Thus, the feeling of
being subjected to unjustified views and actions of othersmade for an ‘underdog position’,
the main thing that tied the angry farmers together. They typically presented themselves
as ‘victims’ (even making shameful comparisons with Jews in WW2). By doing so they
showed that playing the card of impotence does not bring reason.
The movement is also populist since it does not address unequal power relations and
politico-economic contradictions: it only addresses the state. It puts pressure on the state
to create new balances in society that are more favourable for farmers – the costs of which
will be paid by others.
The movement did not eschew violence: it blatantly denied people advocating a
different point of view the right to any say and, on different occasions, it used its powerful
tractors as tools of intimidation. Above all it is regressively populist in as far as it used the
many in order to obtain privilege for the few. It mobilized all farmers to protest against pol-
icies meant to redress the environmental effects of contemporary farming, but the sol-
utions it sought (and won) only served the interests of the few in the entrepreneurial
pole, allowing them more opportunities for future expansion.
The ‘ multi-class’, populist movement that arose in the second half of 2019 addressed a
range of ‘non-issues’ (which effectively helped to mobilize large groups of farmers), whilst
remaining silent on the central issue. That is that both the problem (the large contribution
to the different crises: nitrogen, energy, climate) and the incapacity and unwillingness to
effectively address this problem are rooted in entrepreneurial agricultural and the indus-
trialization of farming it embodies. The populist farmers’movement is silent on this central
issue because it knows that entrepreneurial farming is perceived, and rejected, by the
population at large, as factory farming. It is realized that fighting for factory farming
would be a complete non-starter and have no political or social traction. Hence, the
focus on misleading images, mixed emotions and attacking everything that threatens
and disrespects farmers and a complete neglect of discussing what farmers stand for
(which, as shown earlier in this article, is very polarised). It could not have been otherwise.
The socio-political situation that the entrepreneurial farmers have helped to shape
18In France, Spain and Germany similar actions of ‘vegans’ and the like have produced comparable effects.
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(together with agribusiness, state policy and Wageningen science) cannot but give birth to
this strange populist-type of outburst.
8. A historical precedent
It is not the first time in the recent history of the Netherlands that a farmers’movement has
taken the form of a right-wing populist phenomenon. There is a historical legacy from the
1930s when considerable parts of the Dutch farming population (especially the poor seg-
ments living and working on the sandy soils in the east and centre of the country) followed
the populist (and pre-fascist) movement called Landbouw en Maatschappij [Agriculture
and Society] which shared links with the National Socialist Movement (NSB) and, later
on, with the Germans (de Ru 1980). A long-time collective memory helped to avoid the
emergence of similar movements in the post-war period as people felt deeply ashamed.
From the 1960s onwards there was the rise and subsequent fall of the ‘Farmers’ Party
[Boerenpartij] (see Nooij 1968). There is still debate as to whether this was a populist, a
quasi-fascist or a completely ridiculous movement19. But there are more recent
expressions as well.
In the early 1990s the intensive pig breeding sector in the Netherlands faced a deep
and multi-facetted crisis that had both economic and environmental aspects. Typically
(especially in retrospect) this multiple crisis was framed in two contrasting ways. In one
view the crisis was due to the country (and the EU in general) having far too many pigs.
Overproduction was causing both low prices and rampant pollution. This analysis was
shared by 65% of pig producers of that time (Ettema et al. 1995, 37). In the contrasting
vision there was (and is) no problem whatsoever with the amount of animals held in
the country (which implies that ‘being related to the land’ is not seen as an issue).
Rather the problem was that that were too many pig producers in the country. This view
was shared by 35% of respondents (n = 683). By reducing the number of pig producing
farms, these farmers thought that the total available income would be shared by fewer
farmers, thereby increasing income per farmer. It was equally assumed that the larger
(remaining) farms would then be able to invest in technologies thereby reducing their
environmental impact.
Regardless of these hugely contrasting diagnostic differences, the 1990s saw the emer-
gence of a strongly regressive populist movement called NVV [Nederlands Vakbond van
Varkenshouders: Dutch Syndicate of Pig Producers] headed by Wien van den Brink (a
large pig producer from the centre of the country). This movement typically was ‘multi-
class’. There were large pig producers, mainly operating in the shadows, who defined
the programmatic demands (no generic reductions)20 and small pig producers who oper-
ated as ‘the foot soldiers’ in the many struggles and fights. Other actors involved included
contract workers and transport-enterprises involved in slurry trading who provided the
heavy ‘armaments’ (as pig producers mostly did not have heavy tractors and big lorries)
19There has been widespread conservative populism among the peasantries throughout Europe (such as the Greenshirts in
France and, later on, the support for Le Pen, just as there is currently wide spread rural support for right-wing movements
in, e.g., the USA and Germany (see for an overview Scoones et al. 2018).
20These large pig producers were also members of the NCB, the southern farmers’ union. The double membership and the
threat to completely switch their membership to the NVV allowed them to introduce the same programmatic ingredients
into the policy programme of the national farmers’ union.
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and, finally, weeping farm women who played their part in providing the ‘human element’
in the media. This movement became quite violent: Members of Parliament were thrown
into canals, the Minister of Agriculture of the time was physically attacked and even kid-
napped, whilst scholars who spoke out in public were also threatened.
The movement went on to stand candidates for parliament (Van den Brink was actually
elected but unable to construct any coalition) before losing momentum. Yet, this earlier
populist farmers’ movement left a dual legacy. First, the call for an absolute reduction in
the number of pigs raised in the Netherlands (proposed by the, then, Minister of Agricul-
ture van Aartsen) was effectively sabotaged. Second, the movement left a template that
was later (i.e. in 2019) effectively used for resisting policies aimed at mitigating the
climate crisis.
9. An international comparison
It is interesting to compare the 2019 Dutch farmers’ protests with farmers’ movements
elsewhere21. Tellingly, Belgium, Denmark and Austria did not experience any significant
farmers’ protests in 2019. Italy and Spain witnessed large demonstrations, but their char-
acter differed remarkably from the Dutch ones. Germany and France, in their turn, pre-
sented a more complicated situation – a mixture that contained ingredients of both the
Netherlands and Italy and Spain.
Austria did not see any farmers’ protests in 2019, probably because the country has
long adapted the environmental standards set by the European Union. There were also
no protests in Belgium, and Denmark (whose agriculture probably most closely resembles
that of the NL) saw only limited protests. This probably underlines the centrality of policy in
the dynamics of populist movements: they need the ‘misunderstanding’ or ‘unwilling’
state in order to articulate their grievances. In Denmark the debate about stricter environ-
mental and climate regulation was largely diffused by the decision of the previous (rightw-
ing) government to soften the countries’ N-regulation (this despite a heated discussion
between policy makers and scholars about the measures and their consequences).
Thus, Denmark did not see the same protests that occurred in the Netherlands.
However, the new Danish government is reassessing this regulation and has announced
a progressive approach to climate regulation. This may bring about a completely new
situation.
In March 2019 Spanish farmers protested against low prices for agricultural products
and rallied and marched to denounce the abandonment and depopulation of the country-
side in November. Farmers’ protests in Italy expressed opposition to accepting the world
market as the organizing principle for food production and circulation (a denial that was
and is completely absent in the protests of Dutch agricultural entrepreneurs, who embrace
the world market). The Italian Coldiretti organized road blocks and checks of trucks at the
border with Austria, drawing media attention to their opposition to low-cost imports of
milk, meat and other agricultural products. Whilst doing so, they highlighted the superior
quality of Italian products. Italian rice producers also protested, during 2019, against low-
21I am grateful to Andrea Fink-Keßler, Véronique Lucas, Manolo Gonzalez de Molina, Egon Noe, Kees de Roest, Markus
Schermer and Joost Dessein for having provided data for this section. If these are misrepresented the responsibility is
solely mine.
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priced imports of rice from Cambodia, Thailand and Burma and the potentially negative
effects of the Free Trade Agreement (then being negotiated) between the EU and Vietnam.
The situation in France and Germany last year was more complicated. In Germany a
small group of activists, inspired by the huge demonstrations in the Netherlands called
for actions in different cities. These were mainly coordinated through a Facebook group
(tellingly called Land schafft Verbindung: Land creates connections). The actions did
indeed materialize, in many different cities, on the 22nd of October. In Bonn the protest
attracted 10,000 farmers and 1,600 tractors. This was followed by many more manifes-
tations, included one in Hamburg on the 14th of November (with more than 4,000 tractors)
and smaller regional manifestations throughout the country in December, with the most
recent (and huge) one in Berlin on the 17th of January 2020. As in the Netherlands these
protests denounce ‘the permanent negative propaganda and farmer bashing that leads to
anger and frustration’ (LsV press release of 19/11/2019). They also strongly oppose further
limitations on fertilizer use and especially on the application of pesticides (notably
Roundup). But in contrast to the Netherlands, the programme of the protesting German
farmers also includes more peasant-like claims22: ‘Imported food needs to meet the
German quality standards, if not it should be written on it that “this food is produced in
a way not allowed in Germany”’. Furthermore ‘all food should carry an indication of
origin so as to make it easy for the consumer to recognize regional products’23. Finally
there are demands for reducing the ‘bureaucratic burden for farmers, so that animal
welfare, care for landscape and protection of the environment will be joyful again’.
In France a deep socio-political division within the farming population, similar to the
one existing in the Netherlands, was recently brought to the fore (once again)24 in a repre-
sentative survey of daily Ouest France (Ifop, October 2019; n = 418). When asked about the
‘most threatening developments’, 44% of the surveyed farmers referred to climate change.
32% pointed to ‘the market, low prices and volatility’ and 31% to ‘agri-bashing’ (more than
one answer could be given). Another set of questions probed the best possible policy to
secure the future of French agriculture. Forty eight per cent argued that the power balance
between farmers, food industries and large retailers needed to be corrected: the same pro-
portion said that food distribution (and consumption) needs to be grounded on the prin-
ciple of proximity, while 44% argued that food quality and security are the main areas to
apply leverage. All this strongly contrasts with very low preference for the standard reper-
toire of solutions: conquering new markets (13%), applying new technologies (13%) or
scale enlargement of farm enterprises (9%). ‘Business as usual’ hardly seems attractive
or feasible to most French farmers.
A first round of manifestations (in July 2019) was directed against the Free Trade
Arrangements (Mercosur and CETA) and was followed, in October and November, by a
second round that centred on agribashing, new environmental constraints25 and low
22Taken from www.lanschafftverbindung.de
23This looks innocent, at least at first sight. But tellingly it is about seeing consumers as potential allies instead of hostile
‘others’.
24This same socio-political division has been reflected, already for decades, in the plurality of farmers’ organizations – some
of them close to peasant agriculture, others representing entrepreneurial agriculture.
25Just as in Germany, glyphosate is central here as well. The specific French element is that many mayors have declared their
municipalities to be ‘pesticide free zones’. This, just like the massive animal welfare actions, has caused considerable dis-
content among farmers and even brought farmers’ organizations (that otherwise strongly disagree) together in one
unified coalition – just as happened in Germany, the Netherlands, and, in a way, in Spain as well.
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prices. Remarkably, it was the large, official, farmers’ union FNSEA [Fédération Nationale des
Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles: National Federation of Farmers’ Unions] that took the
lead. As elsewhere (notably in the Netherlands, but also in Germany), the FNSEA presented
agribashing as a generalized problem: lumping together physical attacks by animal
welfare activists, the environmental policies of the state, the assumed unwillingness of
consumers to pay remunerating prices, the climate crisis, etc., into one category that
refers to ‘others’ and which helps to avoid the needed debate on the crisis within agricul-
ture. The avoidance of such a debate partly stems from the FNSEA itself being deeply
involved in the concrete production, processing and distribution of food (in the same
way as the LTO in the Netherlands and the Deutsche Bauern Verband [German Farmers’
Union] in Germany). It is also related to the large heterogeneity within French agriculture
in which there are different actors, views, interests and prospects. The populist argument
about agribashing seems to be the best possible way forward for umbrella organizations
as FNSEA and the like.
At the other end of the political spectrum, organizations such as Confedération Pay-
sanne [Peasant Confederation] are starting to distantiate themselves from the ‘agribash-
ing’ framework. As José Bové and others argued
there is no point in saying that farming is evil, nor in declaring that urban people don’t
like farmers. What is to be criticized is the model that pulls both farmers and our society
into the swamp. This model is dangerously indebting farmers, depopulating the
countryside […], destroying biodiversity, contaminating soils and water, degrading
the health of ecosystems and mankind and contributing to climate change. (Bové
et al. 2019)
On the other hand, though, these militant organizations and people too often reduce the
persistence of entrepreneurial farming to the assumed unwillingness of those farmers to
change while not paying much attention to the structural path-dependency and other
mechanisms that lock these farmers into the dominant socio-technical regime. This is
clearly limiting their impact and reach.
Overall the state of the main agricultural systems in Western Europe presents a worry-
ing picture, with radical, right-wing populist movements quickly gaining ground (reflect-
ing, and reinforcing, similar tendencies in the broader political landscape). Yet, as
documented in this section, there are considerable differences as well. These differences
suggest that the relative weight of entrepreneurial and peasant-like ways of farming
within the farming sector as-a-whole is important and reflected in the nature of the
claims that farmers bring forward. The more ‘modernized’ an agricultural sector is (i.e.
the larger the relative weight of the entrepreneurial segment), the stronger the tendency
among farmers to turn their backs on the future. That is a strange, if not Faustian outcome
of ‘modernization’.
10. The sack of the potatoes
If the ‘hot, green autumn of 2019’ teaches us anything it is that the widely spread peasant-
like ways of farming are, so far, too scattered and fragmented, particularly, but not only, in
the Netherlands. Although such farmers have developed many novel approaches and
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practices for tackling and solving the energy, nitrogen and climate crises, and offer, on the
whole, a promising alternative to the industrialization of farming (see Ploeg et al. 2019 for
an overview), these many and widespread peasant-like ways of farming have not found a
way to engage in and influence public discourse and policy-making. Entrepreneurial
farming (again: especially, but not only, in the Netherlands) is hegemonic – to the point
that many still believe that there is no alternative. Peasant-like farming is lost in a fog of
silence and, thus, the public (by and large) remains ignorant about its potential. As a
result, peasants are muddling through individually. A long time ago an important political
philosopher compared peasants to a ‘sack of potatoes’. Today, it seems, the situation is
even worse. There is not even a ‘sack’. Such a unifying device, that is able to represent
them and to engage in public debate and policy making, is needed now more than
ever. It would help to show the weight and relevance of peasant agriculture and, by uni-
fying what is currently dispersed, would equally help farming move beyond the current
impasse in addressing the climate and energy crises as well as those prevailing in
farming and rural areas.
The risk we run in Europe is that the bill for the necessary ecological transition (which
the new European Commission has made a core defining policy) will be paid for by the
poor. In the case of the agricultural sector, family farmers (both entrepreneurial and
peasant-like farmers) will be the losers. They not only face ever lower incomes but
also new swathes of environmental restrictions that will be imposed in the transition,
specifically in the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), to fight climate change. In
the meantime, the agroecological movement in Europe is weak and largely urban-
based: it is more concerned with distribution and consumption than with production.
In this context, there is an urgent need to develop an agroecological proposal that
builds on, and unites, the many ‘pockets’ of peasant agriculture and that, at the same
time, deals in an integrated way with the socio-economic and environmental problems
of an industrial agricultural model that is no longer fit for purpose. The international
peasant movement La Via Campesina [The Peasant Path] has rightly argued that only
peasant agriculture is able ‘to cool the climate’ (LVC 2017). It is time to further
develop this point of view in a concrete and unifying proposal. Such a proposal (or ‘uni-
fying device’) must be ‘populist’, ‘class-conscious’ and on the left (Borras 2019) and focus
on exposing the agenda of the elite that controls the corporate food regime, with little
or no regard for farmers’ economic security, consumer choice and local or global mani-
festations of the ‘environmental crisis’. If not the countryside will become a bastion of
the extreme right.
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